Filozofija I Društvo 31 (3):406-419 (2020)

Guglielmo Feis
Università degli Studi di Milano
The paper distinguishes two accounts of legal normativity. One-source accounts claim there is only one source for legal normativity, which is ultimately linguistic. Two-source accounts claim legal normativity is both linguistic and non-linguistic. Two-source accounts claim we need to go beyond language and beyond propositions taken as linguistic entities, while they are one-source accounts? main conceptual tool. Both accounts construct propositions as linguistic. There is, nevertheless, a documented analytic tradition starting with G.E. Moore that constructs propositions as non-linguistic entities. Today, the problem of the unity of proposition and structured propositions are highly debated in metaphysics. How does such debates fit into the one-source vs. two-source picture of legal normativity? Why has analytic legal philosophy failed to consider such an option concerning propositions? This paper thus reconstructs the argumentative dynamics between one-source and two-source accounts; presents the less considered philosophical view of propositions as non-linguistic entities and discusses how to include or dismiss such a philosophical view in the one-source/two-source debate on legal normativity. nema
Keywords Non-linguistic propositions, legal normativity, nonlinguistic normativity, normative propositions
Categories No categories specified
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DOI 10.2298/fid2003406f
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References found in this work BETA

Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
The Unity of the Proposition.Richard Gaskin - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
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