Kreativität im Denken. Eine Kritik des Reliabilitätsarguments von John D. Norton gegen rationalistische Epistemologien zur Methode des Gedankenexperiments

In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin (2005)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that Norton's case against Brown's rationalism about thought experiments suffers from serious shortcomings, which relate to the nature of induction.

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Yiftach J. H. Fehige
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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