The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts

Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The phenomenal character of conscious experience has long been regarded as the major problem for physicalist accounts of consciousness. In recent years, defenders of physicalism have typically been relying on the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy to avoid dualism. In this paper, we argue with PCS that cognitive-physicalistic explanations can account for the peculiarities of phenomenal character. However, we think that the conceptual features PCS investigates are not the genuine causes of the special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness but only symptoms, which can themselves be explained in terms of the features of the sensory-perceptual representations underlying conscious experiences, namely that some, but not all, of these states are representationally unstructured.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 98-124.
New Wave Pluralism.David Ludwig - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):545-560.
Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
Conceptualizing physical consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.
Defending the phenomenal concept strategy.E. Díaz-Leon - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.
Transparently oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One.Dorothée Legrand - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-04

Downloads
38 (#309,085)

6 months
1 (#448,551)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Peter Fazekas
University of Antwerp
Zoltan Jakab
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

Citations of this work

What it is like.Haoying Liu - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations