Comparative Evaluation of Free Will in Muhammad Taqi Ja’fari and John Searle’s View

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (1):5-30 (2021)
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Abstract

The question of free will has long been considered one of the most important philosophical questions. It can be said that different and even conflicting opinions have been expressed on this issue. Allamah Jafari and John Searle are two thinkers who, in their intellectual framework, have made a significant contribution to clarifying the “free will” debate. The two thinkers agree on various issues such as the role of the ‘I’ in creating free will, the non-randomness of action, the existence of a gap before activity, and so forth. They also differ on issues such as “the meaning of free will or freedom,” “the scope of freedom or free will,” and the “Divinity of ‘I’ or non-divinity of ‘I’.” Allamah Jafari, besides the rational and reasoning method, pays attention to the scientific context. Searle also has a scientific and reasoning view of the question of free will. Jafari proves free will by introducing the metaphysical self. Moreover, consciousness has a unique role in his theory. Searle, On the other hand, with the concepts of “consciousness” and dependence on the “non-empirical self,” seeks to create a hole for proving free will. Jafari’s view about freedom is that we have free will. Therefore, his approach in this regard is liberal. But Searle plays a role in explaining the issue of “free will” by proposing two hypotheses. Both philosophers believe that the substantial evidence for the existence of free will is that we always think before we act. This thinking causes a gap between the period before the action and the time of the action. According to Jafari, a gap appears in the time “before the action” and “the time of the action.” But in Searle’s view, this gap appears between “reasons for the decision,” “the decision” and “the decision and the action,” and between “the action and the continuation of that action.” A careful examination of the views of these two philosophers can open a new way for the question of “free will” and “freedom.” This is because both thinkers have also dealt with scientific issues and have considered various aspects of the phenomenon of “will” and its freedom or lack of freedom have been considered. This article, in addition to describing and clarifying the opinion of the two philosophers, is responsible for analytical, comparative, and critical points. The comparative and critical analysis of this article reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the views of these two philosophers. The idea of Jafari and John Searle is a new view on the issue of free will. Finally, it can be said that the scientific and philosophical attitude of these two philosophers can be a new way to develop other influential theories in this field. We can summarize the contents in such a way that this article includes the views of two philosophers along with analytical, critical, and comparative evaluation. The purpose of this study is to provide a new solution and further clarify the issue of free will with a descriptive-analytical method.

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Morteza Zare
A.V.C. College

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