Eidetic Reduction, The Origin of Heidegger’s Departure from Husserl

Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 10 (18):111-124 (2016)
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Abstract

By reducing the history and actuality of things, phenomenology attains to pure phenomena, and so it makes its special realm itself. But we would lose the world by phenomenological reduction, and we must acquire the world by phenomenological constitution, beginning from eidoses. As we would demonstrate, consequences of eidetic reduction are beyond remedy. Parallel to reduction of the world, the transcendental ego would reduce to absolute ego (eidos ego) too, and so we lose the clue of the constitution of the world. Heidegger noticed the problem so soon, and by taking worldliness primitive, attained to a different understanding of the world and subject (Dasein). In this article, alongside analyzing the causality and its relation to the world and transcendental ego, we would consider this problem and the way of departure from it to existentialist philosophy of Heidegger. In fact their separation from each other was begun at very first, at eidetic reduction.

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