Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 14 (2):63-113 (2009)
AbstractThe paper discusses the relations between two putative epistemic principles, Reflexivity and Closure, with a view to assess whether the repudiation of the former, usually required by externalistic accounts of knowledge, necessitates the repudiation, as well, of the latter. A negative reply to that question is offered, which prompts the hypothesis that alleged counterexamples to Closure are artifacts of the rather peculiar conditions on which, in the course of a particular kind of epistemological inquiry, are introduced assumptions such as are characteristic of the methodological use of so-called skeptical “doubts”
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References found in this work
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
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