Bulletin of the Section of Logic 50 (2):131-149 (2021)

Authors
Federico L. G. Faroldi
University of Ghent
Abstract
After putting forward a formal account of value disagreement via imprecise measures, I develop a logic of value attribution and of agreement based on truthmaker semantics.
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DOI 10.18778/0138-0680.2021.07
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References found in this work BETA

Angellic Content.Kit Fine - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):199-226.
HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic.Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):305-405.
Value Relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.

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