Peirce on Reality, Truth, and the Convergence of Inquiry in the Limit

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):541 - 566 (2005)
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Abstract

The article analyzes how American philosopher Charles Peirce understands the concept of reality. He identifies the real as that which is independent of what any individual thinks about it and as a type of cognition and as the object of inquiry. Obtrusive realism and projective realism are the two central elements in Peirce's thoughts on reality. A set of problems relating to Peirce's assumption that inquiry must ultimately focus on true beliefs about reality is also presented

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10.1353/csp.2011.0053

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Citations of this work

What is Field's Epistemological Objection to Platonism?Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2019 - In Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.), Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday. Lund, Sverige: Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 123-133.
Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday.Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.) - 2019 - Lund, Sverige: Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
Will science and proven experience converge or diverge? : The ontological considerations.Johannes Persson - 2019 - In Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.), Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday. Lund, Sverige: Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 97-106.
Too Many Omissions, Too Much Causation?Björn Petersson - 2019 - In Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.), Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday. Lund, Sverige: Department of Philosophy, Lund University.

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