La objeción de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia

Pensamiento y Cultura 18 (2):6-28 (2015)
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This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to the solution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, when Plato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achieved is induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semantic criticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theory is not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.

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Alejandro Farieta
University of Sussex

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References found in this work

"Anamnesis" in the "Meno".Gregory Vlastos - 1965 - Dialogue 4 (2):143-167.
Analytica Posteriora. Aristóteles - 1958 - De Gruyter Akademie Forschung.
Aristotelian induction.Jaakko Hintikka - 1980 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 34 (3):422.

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