La imposibilidad de un consecuencialismo moderado

Análisis Filosófico 20 (1-2):7-32 (2000)
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Abstract

Consequentialism is and ethical theory which accepts only agent-neutral reasons. A moderate consequentilist also accepts that –in certain circumstances- agent-relative reasons of autonomy can override an agent-neutral reason. And a deontologist believes in the existence of agent-relative reasons in the form of deontological constraints. But the moderate consequentialist faces a dilemma: she must accept as a valid option an action that causes harm to others, or she must accept at least one deontological constraint, i.e., a constraint against harming others by means of an action. However, if she accepts a deontological constraint, she is not a moderate any more. So, if you begin accepting agent-relative reasons of autonomy, the end of the road is the acceptance of deontological constraints.

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