Analysis 75 (3):362-370 (2015)

Authors
Delia Fara
Last affiliation: Princeton University
Abstract
Consider the following sentences: In every race, the colt won; In every race, John won.John Hawthorne and David Manley say that the difference between these two sentences raises a problem for Predicativism about names. According to the currently more standard version of Predicativism, a bare singular name in argument position, like ‘John’ in , is embedded in a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. The problem is supposed to be that permits a covarying reading that allows for different races to have been won by different colts, while does not permit a covarying reading—it can be true only if there is a single John that won every race. But, the objection runs, if the name ‘John’ is really embedded in a definite description with an unpronounced definite article, then the two sentences are structurally parallel and should not differ with respect to covariation. Appealing to Jason Stanley's ‘Nominal Restriction’ , I show that the difference between the two sentences above not only does not raise a problem for Predicativism but also is actually predicted by it
Keywords Predicativism  Names  John Hawthorne  David Manley  Nominal Restriction  Jason Stanley
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anv042
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
The Reference Book.John Hawthorne & David Manley - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
On Referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Names in Strange Places.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (5):429-472.
Lexical-Rule Predicativism About Names.Aidan Gray - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5549-5569.
‘The’ Problem for the-Predicativism.Robin Jeshion - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (2):219-240.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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