Is there collective scientific knowledge? Arguments from explanation

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):247-269 (2011)

Abstract

If there is collective scientific knowledge, then at least some scientific groups have beliefs over and above the personal beliefs of their members. Gilbert's plural-subjects theory makes precise the notion of ‘over and above’ here. Some philosophers have used plural-subjects theory to argue that philosophical, historical and sociological studies of science should take account of collective beliefs of scientific groups. Their claims rest on the premise that our best explanations of scientific change include these collective beliefs. I argue that Gilbert's account of collective scientific belief does not provide a better explanation of scientific change than a non-collective alternative. A different defence of collective scientific belief and knowledge is needed

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,660

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-15

Downloads
111 (#108,348)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Similar books and articles

Author's Profile

Melinda Bonnie Fagan
University of Utah

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Group Inquiry.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1099-1123.
Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
Disciplinary Capture and Epistemological Obstacles to Interdisciplinary Research: Lessons From Central African Conservation Disputes.Evelyn Brister - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 56:82-91.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations