Generalized sharing, membership size and pareto efficiency in teams

Theory and Decision 48 (1):47-60 (2000)

Abstract

We first show that the Generalized Sharing mechanism which is exhaustive, allows a team of identical members voluntarily supplying the observable effort to attain Pareto efficient production under increasing returns provided team size is allowed to vary. We then show that where true effort is imperfectly observable (moral hazard) Pareto efficient production under nonconstant returns to scale is still attainable by varying team size

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,660

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-02

Downloads
42 (#273,973)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Similar books and articles

Perception of Size.Aage Slomann - 1968 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):101 – 113.
Can Economics Rank Slavery Against Free Labor in Terms of Efficiency?Lawrence H. White - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (3):327-340.
Envy and Efficiency.Joseph Heath - 2006 - Revue de Philosophie Économique 13.
Wishful Thinking in the Prediction of Competitive Outcomes.Paul C. Price - 2000 - Thinking and Reasoning 6 (2):161 – 172.

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations