«Condizione di possibilità dell’esperienza» o «relazione d’essenza»? Apriori teoretico e apriori etico in Kant e Reinach

In Stefano Caroti & Alberto Siclari (eds.), Filosofia e religione. Studi in onore di Fabio Rossi. Parma: E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni. pp. 258-289 (2014)
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This paper analyzes the objections of Adolf Reinach to Kant’s transcendental apriorism, shedding light on (1) the speculative distance separating their conceptions of philosophy (namely Reinach’s phenomenology and Kant’s transcendental critique), and (2) the consequential misunderstanding which is at the core of Reinach’s confrontation with Kant. In particular, attention is paid to the issue of the transcendental constitution of objectness, i.e. the question of the givenness of an object with respect to certain functions proper to the subject. In order to illustrate how such a concept is completely absent in Reinach, I will compare his position with those of Husserl, in their relations with Kant’s interpretation of Hume’s philosophy.

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Faustino Fabbianelli
University of Parma

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