Two Objections to Wide-Scoping

Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):251-255 (2011)
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Abstract

Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.

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Daan Evers
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Cornell University Press.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ethics 96 (3):604-619.
Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives.P. S. Greenspan - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (10):259-276.

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