Abstract
This book contains a vigorous argument, constructed with the help of Kierkegaard, that the Kantian ideal of autonomy in ethics is misplaced, and that the most adequate forms of the ethical life see ethics as requiring a religious foundation. The ideal of an ethic that is grounded in "pure, impartial reason" is a chimera; no justification for ethical living can be given that does not see ethical knowledge as stemming from a "committed" or "situated" perspective that eschews the disengaged "view from nowhere." The ideal of disengagement, when universalized, produces skepticism in epistemology and amoralism in ethics. Since this ideal is itself a type of ethical stance, Rudd agrees with Kierkegaard that it cannot be "objectively" refuted, but can and must be rejected. In exploring Kierkegaard’s epistemology, Rudd correctly sees that this Kierkegaardian emphasis on "subjectivity" as necessary for knowledge by no means implies any kind of relativism or subjectivism about truth.