In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond

Oxford University Press (2009)
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Abstract

This book explores the idea that we have two minds - one automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. It brings together leading researchers on dual-process theory to summarize the state of the art highlight key issues, present different perspectives, and provide a stimulus to further work.

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original Frankish, Keith; St B. T. Evans, Jonathan (2009) "In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond". Oxford University Press

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An architecture for dual reasoning.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
How many dual process theories do we need: one, two or many?Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
Dual-process models: A social psychological perspective.Eliot R. Smith & Elizabeth C. Collins - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--216.
Dual-process models: a social psychological model.Eliot R. Smith & Collins & C. Elizabeth - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.

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Keith Frankish
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Dual PECCS: A Cognitive System for Conceptual Representation and Categorization.Antonio Lieto, Daniele Radicioni & Valentina Rho - 2017 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 29 (2):433-452.
Introspection, Transparency, and Desire.Michael Roche - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (3):132-154.
Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-François Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences. New York, NY: Routledge.

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