Abstract
Wahrheit und Evidenz was edited by Kraus from lectures, notes, unpublished fragments, and letters written by Brentano to Anton Marty, Kraus, and Husserl. The central topics are Brentano's realistic theory of knowledge and his doctrine of judgment and truth based on his notion of "the evident." In general, evidence is specified in relation to acts of judgment: acts of judgment are mental, not merely linguistic, acts, and mental acts place one squarely in the domain of psychology, in particular, empirical psychology, as Brentano was concerned to develop it. Thus Brentano's epistemology is reduced almost wholly to psychology, but in a way in which—through the notion of "the evident"—Brentano feels secure against Husserl's charge of psychologism. This is but one of many argument-themes that recurs in this book. Taken together they demonstrate the fact of Brentano's importance for the contemporary discussion in both phenomenology and analytical philosophy; and Brentano's handling of these themes supports the thought that his own epistemology remains a more systematic and coherent doctrine than the epistemologies of either of its offspring. Kraus' notes are invaluable and the translation is a masterpiece of clarity.—E. A. R.