Foundations of Physics 50 (6):555-567 (2020)
AbstractOn the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed.
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References found in this work
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Dynamics of Reason.Michael Friedman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702-712.
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