Abstract

In this dissertation I investigate the use made recently in philosophy of law and in ethical theory of Friedrich Waismann's theory of the open texture of empirical terms. Open textured terms are permanently potentially vague. In chapter one I explain Waismann's theory and H. L. A. Hart's adaptation of it as the foundation of his theory of judicial discretion. In chapter two I criticize Ronald Dworkin's attack on Hart's theory of discretion; I argue that his concept/conception distinction cannot do the work of eliminating judicial discretion which is non-trivial. In chapter three I consider and reject the theories of evaluation and moral reasoning found in R. M. Hare and Philippa Foot, and I explain how their underlying and hidden similarities led Julius Kovesi to develop his theory of moral judgment and reasoning, which he bases on the open texture of moral terms. In chapter four I explicate and criticize Kovesi's theory of moral reasoning. I accept his claim that the alleged difficulty of constructing an argument with "descriptive" premisses and an "evaluative" conclusion is a pseudo-problem which results from neglecting the open texture of moral terms. But I argue that Kovesi's theory does no concrete work in solving ethical problems, and that this is because of its excessive reliance on a notion of moral similarity, its rejection of an evaluation model of moral reasoning, its neglect of the practical character of moral reasoning, and its assumption that insoluble moral dilemmas are impossible. In the conclusion, chapter five, I claim that an adequate ethical theory must reject the legal model and develop a theory of intrinsic good as well as take seriously the practical and sometimes dilemmatic character of moral situations