Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection

Metaphysica (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Drawing from a Sellarsian realist-naturalist epistemology, we trace different levels of cognitive hierarchy procedures through which a representational system learns to update its own states and improve its ‘map-making’ capabilities from pre-conscious operations which modulate base-localization functions, to patterns of epistemic revision and integration at the conceptual and theoretical levels, producing a nomological double of its world. We show how ontological theorization becomes diachronically coordinated with and constrained by empirical science, and how the formal-quantitative kernel of scientific theories corresponds to qualitative-conceptual determinations at the structural level. Following Johanna Seibt’s characterization of ontology as a theory of categorial inference, we trace the preservation of inferential semantic structure across ontological theories in relation to model languages and provide provisional indications to coordinate Seibt’s account with a convergent realist assessment of systematic modeling, defining the epistemological conditions for articulating the preservation of formal structure in theories toward a limit-point of enquiry.

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reprint Erkan, Ekin (forthcoming) "Retraction of: Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection". Metaphysica ():

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References found in this work

Cognitive maps in rats and men.Edward C. Tolman - 1948 - Psychological Review 55 (4):189-208.
From Empiricism to Expressivism.Robert Brandom - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
I.Wilfrid Sellars - 1981 - The Monist 64 (1):3-36.
Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality.Robert Brandom - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):587-609.

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