Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International (1994)
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| Abstract |
Various versions of the objection to utilitarianism that it is too demanding are discussed and rejected. It is argued that a scalar version of utilitarianism that makes wrongness a matter of degree further improves the prospects for utilitarianism to escape the demandingness-objection.
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| Keywords | Consequentialism (Ethics Scalar utilitarianism Demandingness |
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| Call number | BJ1031.E75 1994 |
| ISBN(s) | 9122016112 9789122016113 |
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