Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for (Some) Hybrid Expressivists

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):39-53 (2015)
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Hybrid expressivists depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express beliefs and desires. Daniel Boisvert and Michael Ridge, two prominent defenders of hybrid views, also depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express general attitudes rather than an attitude towards the subject of the sentence. This article argues that even if the shift to general attitudes helps solve some of the traditional problems associated with pure expressivism, a view like Ridge's, according to which the descriptive meaning is speaker relative, turns out to have problems explaining moral disagreement



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John Eriksson
University of Gothenburg

Citations of this work

Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 243-259.
A Normative Theory of Disagreement.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):189-208.

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References found in this work

Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The language of morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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