Disagreement and inconsistency: a problem for orthodox expressivism

Synthese 200 (5):1-17 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What makes two sentences inconsistent? Expressivists understand the meaning of a sentence in terms of the mental state it expresses. In order to explain the inconsistency between two sentences, the expressivist must appeal to some inconsistency feature of the mental states expressed. A simple explanation is that two sentences, e.g., “murder is wrong” and “murder is not wrong” are inconsistent by virtue of expressing mental states that disagree. Schroeder argues that the expressivist lacks a plausible explanation of the disagreement. Baker & Woods argue that Schroeder is wrong. With these authors, I agree that expressivists have an explanation of disagreement, but this does not adequately explain why two sentences are inconsistent. The reason is that two intuitively inconsistent sentences do not necessarily express mental states that disagree. Moreover, assuming that the expressivist gives a structurally identical explanation for moral and non-moral language, the problem generalizes to non-moral language. It is also argued that the problem extends to thought. How expressivists can and should conceive of inconsistency thus remains a challenge.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Primitive Solution to the Negation Problem.Derek Shiller - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):725-740.
Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for (Some) Hybrid Expressivists.John Eriksson - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):39-53.
Non-descriptive negation for normative sentences.Andrew Alwood - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):1-25.
The problem with the Frege–Geach problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?Caj Strandberg - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):1-15.
Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement.Sebastian Köhler - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.
Minimalist semantics in meta-ethical expressivism.Billy Dunaway - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):351 - 371.
Nothing New in Ecumenia? Hare, Hybrid Expressivism and de dicto Beliefs.Daniel Eggers - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):831-847.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-09-23

Downloads
25 (#598,332)

6 months
8 (#292,366)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Eriksson
University of Gothenburg

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references