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Axiomatics and individuality: A reply to Williams' "species are individuals"
Philosophy of Science 55 (3):427-434 (1988)
Abstract
In her "Species Are Individuals" (1985), Mary Williams offers informal arguments and a sketched proof which allegedly show that species are individuals with respect to evolutionary theory. In this paper, I suggest that her informal arguments are insufficient for showing that clans are not sets and that species are individuals. I also argue that her sketched proof depends on three questionable assumptionsAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The empirical inadequacy of species cohesion by Gene flow.Matthew J. Barker - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):654-665.
Integration, individuality and species concepts.Lee Michael & Wolsan Mieczyslaw - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):651-660.
Individuality and Macroevolutionary Theory.Marc Ereshefsky - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):216-222.
References found in this work
Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism.Elliott Sober - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (3):350-383.
The effect of essentialism on taxonomy—two thousand years of stasis.David L. Hull - 1964 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15 (60):314-326.
Species are individuals: Theoretical foundations for the claim.Mary B. Williams - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (4):578-590.
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