In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 105--135 (2011)

Abstract
Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon.
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References found in this work BETA

Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
An Architectonic for Science.Wolfgang Balzer, C. Ulises Moulines & Joseph D. Sneed - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):349-350.

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Citations of this work BETA

What Verities May Be.Igor Douven & Lieven Decock - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):386-428.
Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics.Pablo Lorenzano - 2000 - In Joseph D. Sneed, Wolfgang Balzer & C.-Ulises Moulines (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples. Rodopi. pp. 75-251.

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