Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1689-1699 (2020)

David Enoch
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
This paper responds to a recently popular objection to non-naturalist, robust moral realism. The objection is that moral realism is morally objectionable, because realists are committed to taking evidence about the distribution of non-natural properties to be relevant to their first-order moral commitments. I argue that such objections fail. The moral realist is indeed committed to conditionals such as “If there are no non-natural properties, then no action is wrong.” But the realist is not committed to using this conditional in a modus-ponens inference upon coming to believe its antecedent. Placing the discussion in a wider epistemological discussion—here, that of “junk-knowledge”, and of how background knowledge determines the relevance of purported evidence—shows that this objection does not exert a price from the realist.
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01507-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.
Metaphysical and Absolute Possibility.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):1861-1872.
How Principles Ground.David Enoch - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.

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