Idealizing Still Not Off the Hook: A Reply to Sobel's Reply

David Enoch
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Many philosophers interested in the nature of moral or other normative truths and facts are attracted to response-dependence accounts. They think, in other words, that the target normative facts are reducible to, or constituted by, or identical with, some facts involving our relevant responses. But these philosophers rarely allow all of our actual responses (of the relevant kind) to play such a role. Rather, they privilege some..
Keywords Metaethics  Response Dependence  Subjectivism  Idealization
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