Correction to: Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable

Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2357-2357 (2020)
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Abstract

In the original publication of the article, some of the references were published incorrectly. The corrected references are provided below

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2021

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10.1007/s11098-020-01537-5

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David Enoch
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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References found in this work

A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.
How Principles Ground.David Enoch - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:1-22.

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