Token Causal Powers

Philosophical Papers 45 (1-2):159-180 (2016)
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This paper proposes that the relation between property instances and token causal powers is akin to the relation between primary substances and property instances on the Aristotelian account of property instantiation. This view permits an individual to have two tokens of the same type of causal power. Paul Audi has argued that this cannot be: two tokens of the same power type are discernible, he claims, only if they are borne by discernible individuals. In the context of this criticism, he proposes that power tokens are individuated in part by the individuals bearing them. This paper responds to Audi’s criticism and argues against his preferred view. This paper thus establishes a theory of token causal powers where previously the literature contained only a presumed view and Audi’s objections.



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Jeff Engelhardt
Dickinson College

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Non-reductive realization and the powers-based subset strategy.Jessica Wilson - 2011 - The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.
Fundamental determinables.Jessica M. Wilson - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):92–102.
Robust Nonreductive Materialism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (10):499.

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