Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216 (2013)
AbstractNormative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.
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Citations of this work
Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.Derek Green - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):159-69.
The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief.C. J. Atkinson - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606.
References found in this work
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.