Singular Terms, Belief, and Reality

Dialectica 31 (3-4):259-272 (1977)
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SummaryIn this paper the apparent disagreement between Kripke and Frege on the analysis of singular terms is analyzed. It is shown that Frege's theory is basically an analysis of belief, while Kripke's theory is basically an analysis of metaphysical and causal contexts. Tentative arguments are presented for showing that these two types of contexts require different analysis, thus neither Kripke nor Frege can be said to have developed a theory handling all opaque contexts.



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