In Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics. Routledge (2022)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
This chapter focuses on the relations between objective probabilities in physical theories at different levels. In general
philosophy of probability, it is frequently assumed that a fundamental deterministic theory cannot support probabilistic phenomena at any higher level, or more generally that there cannot be non-trivial probabilities in higher-level theories that are not encoded in probabilities at the lower level. These assumptions face significant challenges from some
well-understood physical theories – I focus on statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics – where a deterministic description at some lower level gives rise to an effectively probabilistic theory at some higher level; in each case, constraints arising from an objective physical limitation on the acquisition of evidence concerning the lower level plays a crucial role in supporting the higher-level probabilities.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 29 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Determinism and Chance.Barry Loewer - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (4):609-620.
Chance and Determinism.Roman Frigg - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy.
Does Chance Hide Necessity ? A Reevaluation of the Debate ‘Determinism - Indeterminism’ in the Light of Quantum Mechanics and Probability Theory.Louis Vervoort - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Montreal
A Philosophical Guide to Chance: Physical Probability.Toby Handfield - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
Chance, Possibility, and Explanation.Nina Emery - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):95-120.
Objective Chance: Not Propensity, Maybe Determinism.Carl Hoefer - 2016 - Lato Sensu, Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 3 (1).
Chance and Context.Toby Handfield & Alastair Wilson - 2014 - In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press.
Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism.Harald Atmanspacher & Robert Bishop (eds.) - 2002 - Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
A Deterministic Event Tree Approach to Uncertainty, Randomness and Probability in Individual Chance Processes.Hector A. Munera - 1992 - Theory and Decision 32 (1):21-55.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2021-10-17
Total views
64 ( #178,462 of 2,504,831 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #30,234 of 2,504,831 )
2021-10-17
Total views
64 ( #178,462 of 2,504,831 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #30,234 of 2,504,831 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads