Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds? A Difficulty for Fine’s Exact Semantics for Counterfactuals

Journal of Philosophy (5):276-287 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The difficulty undermines Fine's reasons for preferring exact semantics to possible worlds semantics.

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2014-07-21

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Brian Embry
University of Toronto, St. George Campus (PhD)

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Mighty Belief Revision.Stephan Krämer - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):1175-1213.
Aboutness and Modality.Dean McHugh - 2022 - Proceedings of the 23Rd Amsterdam Colloquium.
Context-indexed Counterfactuals.Mariusz Popieluch - 2022 - Studia Semiotyczne 35 (2):89-123.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds.Kit Fine - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):221-246.

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