Moral Sense and Natural Reason

Review of Metaphysics 62 (1):79-110 (2008)
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Abstract

The concern of this paper is to relate the moral philosophy of Hutcheson with a traditional point of view, according to which moral philosophy depends on natural theology. The analysis of this relationship is important because it is a crucial feature of the Hutchesonian moral philosophy. However, this theological outlook does not entirely match his empirical moral epistemology, and this inconsistency allowed David Hume and Adam Smith to throw aside the theological foundation, taking from Hutcheson only the empirical aspects of his epistemology. The intention of this paper is to explain why this theological outlook cannot match a moral epistemology which lacks a metaphysical foundation.

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Francis Hutcheson.Dale Dorsey - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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