Tenenbaum and Raffman on Vague Projects, the Self-Torturer, and the Sorites

Ethics 126 (2):474-488 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman contend that ‘vague projects’ motivate radical revisions to orthodox, utility-maximising rational choice theory. Their argument cannot succeed if such projects merely ground instances of the paradox of the sorites, or heap. Tenenbaum and Raffman are not blind to this, and argue that Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer does not rest on the sorites. I argue that their argument both fails to generalise to most vague projects, and is ineffective in the case of the Self-Torturer itself

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-25

Downloads
878 (#17,454)

6 months
106 (#44,456)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luke Elson
University of Reading

Citations of this work

Collective harm and the inefficacy problem.Julia Nefsky - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (4):e12587.
Sorites On What Matters.Theron Pummer - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 498–523.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Précis of Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):921-928.

View all 15 references / Add more references