Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3):259-267 (2019)
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Abstract

In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new 'reduction' argument against nonreductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his 'simple moral theory' version of the argument doesn’t rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.

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Luke Elson
University of Reading

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References found in this work

Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.
The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 170-84.
Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism.Billy Dunaway - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):627-655.

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