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Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches
Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470 (2013)
Abstract
No abstractDOI
10.1080/13546783.2013.834268
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Citations of this work
The role of explanatory considerations in updating.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Cognition 142 (C):299-311.
Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism: The Case of Explanationism.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
The ecological rationality of explanatory reasoning.Igor Douven - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 79:1-14.
New paradigm psychology of reasoning: An introduction to the special issue edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over.Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):249-265.
References found in this work
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
Rationality in reasoning: The problem of deductive competence.Jonathan Evans & David E. Over - unknown - Current Psychology of Cognition 16 (1-2):3-38.
Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition.Matt Jones & Bradley C. Love - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):169-188.
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