Explaining (One Aspect of) the Principal Principle without (Much) Metaphysics

Philosophy of Science 83 (4):480-499 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to David Lewis’s Principal Principle, our beliefs about the objective chances of outcomes determine our rational credences in those outcomes. Lewis influentially argues that any adequate metaphysics of objective chance must explain why the Principal Principle holds. Since no theory of chance is widely agreed to have met this burden, I suggest we change tack. On the view I develop, a central aspect of the Principal Principle holds not because of what objective chances are but rather because of the explanatory role that objective chances play for the rational agents who believe in them.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1086/687258

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

On what we know about chance.Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
Two mistakes about credence and chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
What Chance‐Credence Norms Should Not Be.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):177-196.
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance.Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):549-596.
Chance, credence, and the principal principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
Can Bayesian agents always be rational? A principled analysis of consistency of an Abstract Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - unknown
On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle.Gergei Bana - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):988-1001.
A closer look at the 'new' principle.Michael Strevens - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):545-561.
Chance, credence, and the principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.
On higher-order and free-floating chances.Justin C. Fisher - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):691-707.
The old principal principle reconciled with the new.Peter B. M. Vranas - unknown
Is quantum suicide painless? On an apparent violation of the principal principle.Milan M. Ćirković - 2004 - Foundations of Science 11 (3):287-296.
How Valuable Are Chances?H. Orii Stefansson & Richard Bradley - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):602-625.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-09-14

Downloads
83 (#198,941)

6 months
23 (#116,291)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katrina Elliott
University of California, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.
No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):105-125.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon & Anne Fagot-Largeault - 1989 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):355.
Two accounts of laws and time.Barry Loewer - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):115-137.
A better best system account of lawhood.Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):1 - 34.

View all 17 references / Add more references