Disagreement in philosophy

Synthese 200 (1):1-16 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Recent philosophical discussions construe disagreement as epistemically unsettling. On learning that a peer disagrees, it is said, you should suspend judgment, lower your credence, or dismiss your peer’s conviction as somehow flawed, even if you can neither identify the flaw nor explain why you think she is the party in error. Philosophers do none of these things. A distinctive feature of philosophy as currently practiced is that, although we marshal the strongest arguments we can devise, we do not expect others to agree. Nor are we dismayed then they do not. Through a survey of familiar professional practices, I argue that philosophy rightly revels in responsible disagreement. This discloses important and perhaps surprising facets of the epistemology of philosophy.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,697

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Suspension and disagreement.Pieter van der Kolk & Sander Verhaegh - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):37-52.
Opschorting en onenigheid.Pieter van der Kolk & Sander Verhaegh - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):37-52.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Disagreement and Deep Agnosticism.Eric Gilbertson - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (1):29-52.
A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):795-811.
Philosophical Peer Disagreement.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):459-467.
The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):169-177.
A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.


Added to PP

73 (#170,673)

6 months
31 (#46,332)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Catherine Elgin
Harvard University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Basic Works of Aristotle. Aristotle - 2001 - New York, NY, USA: Modern Library.

View all 22 references / Add more references