Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190 (2002)
AbstractIn this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
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Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation: Dialogue.Peter Alward - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (1):53-64.