Certain and Uncertain Inference with Indicative Conditionals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper develops a trivalent semantics for the truth conditions and the probability of the natural language indicative conditional. Our framework rests on trivalent truth conditions first proposed by Cooper (1968) and Belnap (1973) and it yields two logics of conditional reasoning: (i) a logic C of certainty-preserving inference; and (ii) a logic U for uncertain reasoning that preserves the probability of the premises. We show systematic correspondences between trivalent and probabilistic representations of inferences in either framework, and we use the distinction between the two systems to cast light on the validity of inferences such as Modus Ponens, Or-To-If, and Conditional Excluded Middle. Specifically, the conditional behaves monotonically in C, but non-monotonically in U; Modus Ponens is valid in C, but valid in U only for non-nested conditionals. The result is a unified account of the semantics and epistemology of indicative conditionals that can be fruitfully applied to analyzing the validity of conditional inferences.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Defending truth values for indicative conditionals.Kelly Weirich - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1635-1657.
Indicative and subjunctive conditionals.Brian Weatherson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals.Niki Pfeifer - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):849-866.
What we can learn from how trivalent conditionals avoid triviality.Daniel Lassiter - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1087-1114.
Exact Semantics for Indicative Conditionals.Hüseyin Güngör - 2017 - Dissertation, Bogazici University
Indicatives at stake.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):755-778.


Added to PP

262 (#77,602)

6 months
170 (#18,176)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jan Sprenger
University of Turin
Lorenzo Rossi
Università di Torino

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

View all 50 references / Add more references