Consent as an act of commitment

European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):194-209 (2024)
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Abstract

Some say that consent is essentially just a state of mind. Others say it is essentially just a communication. Many say it is both. I say it is neither. Instead it is an act, or rather a pair of acts—an internal mental act in the first instance, an external performative act in the second. Each of those acts is an act of commitment, intrapersonally in the first case and interpersonally in the second. The content of the commitment is, familiarly enough, to give permission to someone else to do something that it would be wrong for them to do without your permission. The novelty lies in seeing consent as an act of commitment in those two dimensions and in seeing those as commitments that persist until and unless undone by an act of a similar sort.

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A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Moral Risk and Communicating Consent.Renée Bolinger - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (2):179-207.
How to derive "ought" from "is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication.Tom Dougherty - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (3):224-253.

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