Representing Metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition?

Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):244-254 (2009)
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Abstract

What cognitive mechanisms do people use to represent other people's mental states? Do children who have difficulty processing other people's higher-level mental states such as beliefs also have difficulty processing higher-level non-mental representations such as meta-photographs? See the preprint here or find the final version in print or on the journal website.

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