Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objection

E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 23 (2):37-41 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper presents an objection to John Rawls’s use of the original position method to argue against implementing utilitarian rules. The use of this method is pointless because a small subset of the premises Rawls relies on can be used to infer the same conclusion.

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Author's Profile

Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Rawls and Utilitarianism.Holly Smith Goldman - 1980 - In Gene Blocker & Elizabeth Smith (eds.), John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice. Ohio University Press.

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