On Being ‘Rational’ About Norms

Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):180-186 (1967)
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Abstract

The theses of this paper i: I. that the attempt to found absolute norns on rationality presupposes the availability of a single universal absolute conception of rationality but that no such conception is available; and II. that any conception of rationality which might be available for justifying one's ultimate normative commitments is itself evaluative. “Rationality” itself is a value-laden concept, as are all its philosophical sub-divisions—logic, ethics, aesthetics, axiology, etc. Choosing ultimate value principles under conditions of freedom, enlightenment, and impartiality presupposes that one positively values such things.

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Rem B. Edwards
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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