A value-based solution to the surprise exam paradox

Philosophical Pathways (221):1-2 (2018)
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Abstract

I identify an assumption that the students should not rely on: if the teacher believes that the exam would not be a surprise on a certain day, the teacher will not give the exam on that day. The reason I present for not making this assumption does not involve doubting the moral goodness of the teacher. But it does involve making a value judgment.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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