Another objection from Sidgwick to Rawls’s liberty principle, and a response

Abstract

There are other problems for John Rawls’s philosophy that can be extracted from Henry Sidgwick’s discussion of the priority of freedom, apart from the problem H.L.A. Hart focuses on. This paper considers one such problem – that it is an empirical issue whether a sane adult is better off more free, rather than something to be assumed – and presents one Rawlsian solution.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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