Political Authority, Moral Powers and the Intrinsic Value of Obedience

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (1):179-191 (2010)
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Abstract

Three concepts—authority, obedience and obligation—are central to understanding law and political institutions. The three are also involved in the legitimation of the state: an apology for the state has to make a normative case for the state’s authority, for its right to command obedience, and for the citizen’s obligation to obey the state’s commands. Recent discussions manifest a cumulative scepticism about the apologist’s task. Getting clear about the three concepts is, of..

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William A. Edmundson
Georgia State University

Citations of this work

Authority and Reason‐Giving.David Enoch - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
On realist legitimacy.Fabian Wendt - 2016 - Social Philosophy and Policy 32 (2):227-245.

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References found in this work

Kantian constructivism in moral theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.
Are there any natural rights?H. L. A. Hart - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (2):175-191.
Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
Law as Co-ordination.John M. Finnis - 1989 - Ratio Juris 2 (1):97-104.

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