Intention and Coercion

Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (1):75-85 (1988)
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Abstract

In this study I defend an account of 'dispositional coercion' and coercive offers which hinges primarily on the intentions of both the coercer and the victim. In doing so I argue against various baseline accounts of coercion. ;Baseline accounts center on the victim's estimation of a proposal's effect, the determination of coercive threats and offers primarily hinging on the victim's beliefs and preferences. I believe that it is the intended action of the individual making the proposal that provides the core consideration for defining coercive threats and offers. ;The following is my set of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for 'dispositional coercion' wherein X coerces Y to do A: X threatens Y, that is, X intentionally attempts to create the belief in Y that X will be responsible for harm coming to Y should Y fail to do A. X's motive for attempting to create this belief is his desire to bring about a state of affairs in which Y's recognition of this possible harm to himself influences Y to do A. X successfully creates the belief in Y that Y may be harmed if he fails to do A, that is, X is successful in causing Y to recognize that harm may come to him should he fail to do A. Y intends to do A, and Y's motive for intending to do A is Y's desire to avoid harm to himself. Y does A. ;I also argue that X makes Y a coercive offer if and only if: ; X either intentionally attempts to create the following beliefs in Y, or for cases in which X believes that Y already holds beliefs and , attempts to create belief in Y: X is able to prevent some harm from coming to Y. Y needs X's assistance in preventing this harm. X will not assist Y in preventing this harm if Y does not do A. ; X's motive for attempting to create beliefs - in Y, or for cases in which Y already holds beliefs and , to attempt to create belief in Y is his desire to bring about a state of affairs in which Y's recognition of this possible harm to himself influences Y to do A

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Edmund Wall
East Carolina University

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Is “aid in dying” suicide?Philip Reed - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (2):123-139.

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References found in this work

Coercion.Robert Nozick - 1969 - In White Morgenbesser (ed.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. St Martin's Press. pp. 440--72.
Coercion: Its nature and significance.H. J. McCloskey - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):335-351.

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